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FOREWORD: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
PROPERTY
Roger W. Findley*
Private property is the principal institution adopted by Western so-
cieties to allocate land and other scarce resources among private persons,
as well as to provide individuals some security against governmental
domination. The United States Constitution provides that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.' How-
ever, the definitions of "property" and of what constitutes a "taking" are
elastic, and have been expanded and contracted by the United States
Supreme Court over the years.
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1922, Justice Holmes said, "[t]he general rule... is, that while prop-
erty may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking."3 The continuing issue since that time has
been, when does regulation go too far?
Two cases heard by the Supreme Court this term provided opportu-
nities for the Court to give substantial guidance concerning the resolu-
tion of this issue. They are Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 4 and
Yee v. City of Escondido.5 Briefly stated, the facts in these cases are as
follows.
David Lucas purchased two vacant oceanfront lots zoned for single
family houses. Thereafter, to combat erosion, South Carolina enacted a
Beachfront Management Act limiting construction within the beach/
dune system. As applied to the Lucas lots, the Act prohibits, through
statutorily mandated setback lines, construction of any permanent struc-
ture other than a small deck or walkway. Lucas sued in the state court,
claiming that the Act constituted a taking of his property without just
* Professor of Law and Fritz B. Bums Chair of Real Property, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles; A.B., 1957, DePauw University; J.D., 1960, University of Michigan.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. Id. at 415.
4. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
5. 224 Cal. App. 3d 1349, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1990), review denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 353
(Cal. Jan. 24, 1991), aff'd, 60 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1992).
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compensation. The trial court agreed and awarded him $1.23 million.
However, the state supreme court reversed, holding that there is no tak-
ing when a state regulates land use to prevent a serious public harm.
John Yee owns a mobilehome park. In 1988 the City of Escondido
adopted a rent control ordinance limiting the amount by which park
owners could increase rents, even when tenants sell their mobilehomes.
Under the California Mobilehome Residency Law, park owners are re-
quired to accept the successor tenants who purchase mobilehomes unless
they lack financial ability to pay the rent or have demonstrated an un-
willingness to comply with park rules. Yee filed suit in the state court,
claiming that because of the ordinance, selling prices of used
mobilehomes increased dramatically. He contended that the Escondido
ordinance constitutes a "taking" because it enables selling tenants to cap-
ture for themselves the monetary value of living in the rent-controlled
park, thereby working a transfer of this monetary interest from the park
owner, who normally would capture the value through increased rent.
The California trial and appellate courts rejected Yee's claim.
On April 1, 1992, the Supreme Court decided Yee but ducked the
"regulatory taking" issue:
We granted certiorari on a single question pertaining to
the Takings Clause: "Two federal courts of appeal have held
that the transfer of a premium value to a departing mobilehome
tenant, representing the value of the right to occupy at a re-
duced rate under local mobilehome rent control ordinances,
constitute[s] an impermissible taking. Was it error for the state
appellate court to disregard the rulings and hold that there was
no taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments?" This
was the question presented by petitioners. It asks whether the
court below erred in disagreeing with the holdings of the
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits in Pine-
wood Estates of Michigan v. Barnegat Township Leveling Board,
and Hall v. City of Santa Barbara. These cases, in turn, held
that mobile home ordinances effected physical takings, not reg-
ulatory takings. Fairly construed, then, petitioners' question
presented is the equivalent of the question "Did the court below
err in finding no physical taking?"
Whether or not the ordinance effects a regulatory taking is
a question related to the one petitioners presented, and perhaps
complementary to the one petitioners presented, but it is not
"fairly included therein." Consideration of whether a regula-
tory taking occurred would not assist in resolving whether a
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physical taking occurred as well; neither of the two questions is
subsidiary to the other. Both might be subsidiary to a question
embracing both-Was there a taking?-but they exist side by
side, neither encompassing the other.6
The Court held that there was no "physical taking" because the City of
Escondido had not "require[d] the landowner to submit to the physical
occupation of his land .... Petitioners voluntarily rented their land to
mobile home owners." '7
At the time this Foreword was written, the Supreme Court had not
yet decided Lucas. Perhaps that decision will shed some light on the
regulatory taking issue.
It is unusual for a law review to publish briefs submitted to a court,
even in important cases. However, there is good reason for doing so in
this situation. On March 20, 1992, Loyola Law School presented the
First Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture. This lecture took the form of a
debate between Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago
Law School and Professor Joseph Sax of the University of California at
Berkeley School of Law. The debate was titled "The Constitutional
Dimensions of Property: Rent Control, Coastal Management and Regu-
latory Takings." The Lucas and Yee cases were the starting points for
this debate between two of the country's most vocal and preeminent
scholars concerned with the constitutional dimensions of real property
law. Professors Epstein and Sax were invited to participate in the debate,
in part, because each of them had filed an amicus curiae brief in one of
the cases. Those are the briefs which are herein presented.8
The briefs are offered as a "first installment" of the authors' views
on the legal issues involved in the two cases, including the still-open "reg-
ulatory taking" issue in Yee. In the next issue of the Loyola of Los Ange-
les Law Review, to be published in the fall of 1992, the same authors will
present further discussions of these problems, in light not only of their
Loyola debate but also of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Lucas and
Yee cases. Thus, while the briefs appearing herein do not present a direct
clash of views between Professors Epstein and Sax-because they sub-
mitted briefs in different cases-the follow-up articles will do so.
6. Yee, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4306 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 4303.
8. [Editor's note: The briefs have been reprinted as submitted to the United States
Supreme Court. They have not been changed to conform to usual law review citation form.]
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